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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal filed by Aspen Park, Inc. requesting this Court reverse the district 
court's ruling (Honorable Joel E. Tingey) on summary judgment in favor of Bonneville County. 
The district court correctly held that the plain language of I.C. § 63-602GG precluded Appellant 
from qualifying for a low-income housing property tax exemption where not all of Appellant's 
units were dedicated to that purpose. Instead, Appellant leases some of its units to tenants who 
are not considered low-income, as prescribed by statute. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On March 10, 2016, Appellant requested a property tax exemption from Bonneville 
County under LC.§ 602GG. Sitting as a Board of Equalization, the Bonneville County 
Commissioners denied this request on May 9, 2016. R. pp. 15-17. 
Appellant then appealed to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals on June 28, 2016. R. p. 13. 
After hearing, the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals reversed the Board of County Commissioners, 
asserting that the tax exemption was proper. R. pp. 429-437. However, Bonneville County 
filed for reconsideration on April 5, 2017. R. pp. 440-443. After considering briefing from 
both parties, the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals reversed itself, holding that because not all of the 
units were dedicated to low income housing, the property tax exemption was inappropriate. R. 
pp. 457-464. Appellant moved for reconsideration of this decision on May 8, 2017, claiming 
the statute was ambiguous. R. pp. 466-469. But the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals disagreed 
and denied reconsideration. R. pp. 493-494. 
On June 20, 2017, Petitioner filed for Judicial Review before the Seventh Judicial District 
Court. R. pp. 497-499. On September 8, 2017, Bonneville County moved for summary 
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judgment, alleging no issue of material fact existed, and that the issues before the district court 
pertained only to application of law to the facts. R. p. 901. After much briefing and argument 
on summary judgment, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey agreed with Bonneville County that 
Appellant's use of its property was not consistent with the non-profit low-income property tax 
exemption statute because Appellant was not using all of its property for low-income housing. 
R. pp. 961-967. 
Judgment was entered on October 23, 2017. R. p. 969. 
On December 1, 2017, Appellant timely appealed to this Court. R. p. 971-974. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The facts are not in dispute. Appellant is a 50l(c)(3) non-profit organization for income 
tax purposes. R. p. 48. Appellant owns 72 units. Id. Appellant also is also subject to a 
Section 42 regulatory agreement that on page 5 requires 76% of Appellant's units (not less than 
54 units) remain designated as low-income units. See Regulatory Agreement R. pp. 70-92, 
Agreement of Limited Partnership R. pp. 94-157, Redemption Agreement R. pp. 172-186. This 
agreement remains in place until 2023 (15 year compliance period plus another 15 years after the 
compliance period). R. p. 77. Appellant even recently acknowledges its property is Section 
42 housing. R. p. 423. Despite its designation as Section 42 housing, Appellant filed a 
request for a complete property tax exemption as a non-profit organization under I.C. § 63-
602GG rather than requesting property tax relief as Section 42 housing under I.C. §63-205A. 
Of Appellants 72 units, Appellants represented that as of June 15, 2016, these units were 
occupied as follows: 
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ASPEN PARK 
Median Income % of Units(# of Units) 
~60% ::::: 16.66% (12 Units) 
::; 60% - > 50% ::::: 8.33% (6 Units) 
::; 50% - > 30% ::::: 34.72% (25 Units) 
::; 30% ::::: 27.77% (20 Units) 
Vacant ::::: 12.50% (9 Units) 
TOTAL UNITS I 00% (72 Total Units) 
R. p. 33-35. 1 Appellant acknowledges that 12 units have been rented to individuals whose 
income exceeds the 60% county median income threshold. See Appellant 's Brief, p. 3. 
Because these 12 units exceed the low income class ifications contained in LC. § 63-
60200, Appellant has been denied a tax exemption. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Is Appellant entitled to the property tax exemption where Appellant fails to meet the 
statutory burden of having "all" of its units dedicated to low income housing? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is proper ' if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on fi le, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
1 Please note that prior versions of Respondent 's calculations presented to the lower court re ferred to the apartment 
counts that are contained on R. p. 192- 195, which on ly account for between 62 and 63 uni ts-likely due to 
vacancies. Apparently, the chart on R. p. 33-35 includes all 72 units. Though the percentages change slightly due 
to the charts that are used, the principles outlined in this brief remain the same, as a number of the units are rented to 
individuals whose income exceed the 60% of the county median income. 
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" I.R.C.P. 56( c ); Arreguin v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,460, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). 
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C.P. 56(a); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432,437 (Ct. App. 1988), 
meaning that if there is no cognizable defense, then there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
Further, 
Resolution of the possible conflict between the inferences is within 
the responsibilities of the fact finder. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 
898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). This Court exercises free 
review over the entire record that was before the district judge to 
determine whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law and reviews the inferences drawn by the district judge to 
determine whether the record reasonably supports those inferences. 
P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Tr., 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 
(2007). 
ARGUMENT 
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES THIS COURT FROM DEVISING AN 
INTERPRETATION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
STATUTE. 
This case is essentially one of statutory interpretation and the separation of powers. 
Appellants request this Court enforce an interpretation of statute, rather than follow the plain 
language of the statute enacted by the legislature. In short, Appellants request that this Court 
legislate. The Constitution of the State of Idaho mandates: 
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The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no 
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any 
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1. This constitutional article is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 148 and 176. 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). 
Eighty-seven (87) years before Idaho became a state, the United States Supreme Court held the 
Constitution of the United States confers original jurisdiction to one of three branches of 
government, which are not to be encroached upon by other branches. "To what purpose are 
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, 
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? [ ... ] The constitution is either a 
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary 
legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Id. 
at 176-77. Perhaps not so eloquently restated, our constitution is either the supreme law of the 
land or it isn't. If the supreme law of the land establishes boundaries, each branch of 
government is to act within those tried and true boundaries, not beyond them. 
The Constitution of the State of Idaho establishes the same separation of powers 
boundaries as the United States. It empowers the legislature to enact laws and the courts to 
interpret and enforce the laws. Idaho Const. Art. III and V. It is therefore imperative courts 
resist the temptation of delving into the power of legislating. 
This Court has appropriately remained sensitive to this separation of powers and 
enforcing the intent of the legislature by following the plain language of the statutes: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we 
exercise free review. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5 
(2003). It must begin with the literal words of the statute, those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and 
the statute must be construed as a whole. Id If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the 
law as written. Id. [ ... ] If the statute as written is socially or 
otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not 
judicial. Id. 
State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004) abrogated on other grounds 
by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,896,265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011). 
Citing several Idaho Supreme Court decisions, the Idaho Court of Appeals also reasoned: 
The interpretation of a statute begins with its literal words. Those 
words must be given their plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where 
the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. 
Ambiguity is not established merely because different 
interpretations are presented by the parties. If that were the test 
then all statutes whose meanings are contested in litigation could be 
considered ambiguous. "[A] statute is not ambiguous merely 
because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation 
of it." 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho at 354, 298 P.3d at 
248. 
Bonner Cty. v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291,295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(Citations omitted, bold emphasis added); see also Verska, 151 Idaho at 892,265 P.3d at 505. 
In 2011, this Court also clarified this principal while still affirming the constitutional principal of 
separation of powers: 
[W]e have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the 
ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results 
when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do 
so. "The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be 
questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts 
might not agree with the public policy so announced." State v. 
Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 525, 265 P.2d 328, 334 
(1953). Indeed, the contention that we could revise an unambiguous 
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd 
results is itself illogical. "A statute is ambiguous where the language 
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is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Porter v. 
Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 
105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). An unambiguous statute would have only 
one reasonable interpretation. 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896,265 P.3d at 509. 
In this case, Appellant requests this Court cross the boundary between the judicial and 
legislative branches of government by using astute minds to devise an interpretation of a very 
plain statute. Instead, this Court should follow the plain language of the statute. 
II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES 100% OF THE 
HOUSING UNITS BE RENTED BY LOW INCOME OCCUPANTS. 
Because Appellant has not dedicated all of its units to low income housing, it is not 
entitled to the low-income housing property tax exemption under LC.§ 63-60200. 
Before getting stuck in a mire of federal regulations regarding safe harbors that are not 
controlling over state law, it is imperative to remember this case is about the exemption of 
property taxes imposed by Idaho counties, NOT the exemption of income taxes imposed by the 
federal government2• Understanding this distinction debunks the temptation to consider federal 
regulations that muddy and then interpret an otherwise plain state statute. 
J.C. § 63-60300 allows county commissioners to grant a local property tax exemption 
for properties belonging to non-profit companies that are entirely dedicated to low income 
housing. The statute plainly defines how this dedication takes place: 
2 Appellant improperly addresses whether its organization falls under safe harbors of§ 50l(c)(3). A 50l(c)(3) 
designation is merely a threshold requirement to even apply for this property tax exemption. See LC. § 63-
602GG(2)(b ). Instead, the property tax exemption statute focuses on the actual practices and performance of the 
501(c)(3) organization. Bonneville County does not contest Appellant's 50l(c)(3) designation. Instead, 
Appellant simply fails to meet the performance requirements of the property tax exemption statute. 
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(3) In order to qualify for the exemption provided in this section, 
the low-income housing property shall meet the following 
qualifications: 
[ ... ] 
( c) Except for a manager's unit, ALL of the housing units in 
the low-income housing property are dedicated to low-income 
housing IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: Fifty-five percent 
(55%) of the units shall be rented to those earning sixty percent 
( 60%) or less of the median income for the county in which the 
housing is located; twenty percent (20%) of the units shall be 
rented to those earning fifty percent (50%) or less of the median 
income of the county in which the housing is located; AND 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the units shall be rented to those 
earning thirty percent (30%) or less of the median income for the 
county in which the housing is located. 
I.C. § 603GG(c)(3). Emphasis added. 
A. Denial of the Property Tax Exemption Was Appropriate Where the Statute 
is Coniunctive, Not Disiunctive. 
Three key words in this statute require that property tax applicants must be completely 
committed to low income housing with all of their units to qualify for the property tax 
exemption: "ALL", "AND", and "SHALL". Why would the statute say "ALL of the housing 
units" if the legislature really meant "some" or "most" of the housing units? Why would the 
statute use the conjunctive word "AND" when connecting the income classifications if the 
legislature really meant to use the disjunctive term "or"? Why would the statute say "SHALL", 
if the legislature really meant "should" or "may"? The legislature did not err in its language. 
It can be no coincidence with words like "all", "and", and "shall" that the sum total of the 
percentages of both the units and the income classifications in the statute add up to exactly 100% 
in order to qualify for the exemption. Clearly the legislature meant what it said. 
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Appellant argues that it qualifies for thi s exemption when Appellant rents 12 of its 72 
units (about 17%) to individuals who exceed the 60% of the county median income. The 
demographics of Appellant' s units are as follows: 
ASPEN PARK 
Median Income % of Units(# of Units) 
~60% ::::: 16.66% (12 Units) 
~ 60% - > 50% ~ 8.33% (6 Units) 
~ 50% - > 30% ~ 34.72% (25 Units) 
~30% ~ 27.77% (20 Units) 
Vacant ~ 12.50% (9 Units) 
TOTAL UNITS 100% (72 Total Units) 
In th is manner, not all of the units are used for low income housing. In fact, about 17% of the 
units are not used fo r low-income housing. Therefore, the property tax exemption cannot 
apply. 
Appe llant has argued an application of this statute to "all of the housing units" is 
unreasonable, as doing so would require 100% occupancy of the units . We must presume the 
legislature meant what it said. Whether and how units will qualify for this property tax 
exemption is an operational business consideration that a landlord has to make before he/she/it 
can rely on the exemption. The language of the statute does not permit or require the County to 
consider market conditions in deciding whether or not to grant the exemption. 
Regard less, perhaps an argument could be made that the focus of the statute is on the 
allocation of units to certain income classes and not necessarily on occupancy. Under this 
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argument, even vacant units would be dedicated to be rented by low-income occupants so long as 
none of the units rented exceed the 60%, 50% and 30% income thresholds prescribed by statute. 
For example, consider a 100 unit apartment complex. As long as the landlord does not allow 
more than 55 of the apartments to be rented to those making above 60% of the county median 
income, does not allow more than 75 apartments to be rented to those making above 50% of the 
county median income, and ensures the remaining 25 apartments are either occupied by or 
remain open only for those that do not make above 30% of the county median income, that low-
income housing unit may qualify for the exemption. In such a manner, 100% of the units are 
rented to or available for those in the qualifying income classes. By focusing on the allocation 
of the units as directed by the statute, landlords might avoid the precarious situation of the ebbs 
and flows of tenants vacating and leaving the landlord in non-compliance. True, landlords are 
tasked with filling voids with low-income tenants from certain income classes-but this only 
furthers the mission/policy of ensuring low income housing remains available for those in need 
as prescribed by the legislature. 
Even if this vacancy argument were a valid approach, in no event does Appellant's set of 
facts comply with that argument or with the plain language of the statute, where 17% of the units 
are rented to those who exceed the 60% county median income threshold. If a landlord accepts 
a tenant that is not considered low income, that landlord voluntarily jeopardizes his/her/its 
potential property tax exemption. Making this decision may not necessarily disqualify a 
landlord from receiving the income tax exemption, but it clearly violates the plain language of 
I.C. § 63-602GG pertaining to the property tax exemption. Importantly, not "all" of the units 
are dedicated to low income housing when 30, 17, or even 5 percent of the units are not. 
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In this case, not only do 1 7% of the tenants exceed the 60% income threshold, one of the 
tenants actually exceeds 100% of the county median income. R. p. 33. These practices are 
clearly not permitted by the plain language of the statute. By leasing to those tenants, Appellant 
has made a conscious decision to not dedicate "all" of its units to low-income housing as defined 
in LC. 63- §602GG, and therefore jeopardized its own property tax exemption. Appellant still 
may qualify for income tax exemptions under federal law, but not the property tax exemption. 
B. The Plain Language ofl.C. § 63-602GG Requires 100% Compliance, Not 
Righteous Aspirations. 
It is truly admirable that Appellant aspires to the ideal of making its units available to 
those renters who may qualify as low-income tenants. But the low-income housing property 
tax exemption is not an entitlement for those with good intentions. Instead, if Appellant does 
not want to pay property taxes, the legislature has clearly outlined how to dedicate the property 
to obtain the property tax exemption by using the key phrase "in the following manner:."· I.C. 
§. 63-60200(3)( c ). (Emphasis added). The legislature could not have been clearer in saying 
"non-profit organizations, this is how you earn the property tax exemption:" and then outlines 
three income classes that "all of the housing units" must meet. Id (Emphasis added). 
If the non-profit organization fails to comply, there is no penalty; instead the organization 
simply has to pay property taxes like everyone else. Nonprofit organizations must remain 
vigilant in selecting only from the low-income classes identified in the statute if it seeks to obtain 
the property tax exemption. 
Appellant argues that so long as each income classification is met individually, then 
Appellant is entitled to the tax exemption. Using this disjunctive reading, only 55% of the units 
would be required to be used for low-income housing as each subsequent income category can 
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be contained within the prior category (a 30% or less and 50% or less of the median county 
income is also contained in within the 60% or less of the median county income). Appellant's 
reading would therefore mean that 45% of the units, nearly half, do not need to be used for low-
income tenants. This is in direct contradiction to the statutes' use of the word "all". 
Other charitable and non-profit organizations do not receive similar treatment when they 
are not using 100% of their property toward their cause. As further evidence the legislature 
meant what it said in stating "all" of the units must comply, consider LC. § 63-602C. That 
statute allows non-profit companies and charitable organizations to apply for a property tax 
exemption, but only to the extent the non-profit company is using its property consistent with its 
purposes and not for business purposes that derive a revenue. Id. For example, a church that 
leases out 10% of its space for a bakery would only be permitted up to a 90% exemption. If the 
Idaho Legislature wanted to adopt such a model for low-income housing, it is free to do so. In 
that event, Appellant would be permitted up to an 83% exemption but would pay property tax on 
the remaining 1 7% that it leases out to those tenants who are not low income. However, this is 
not what the statute currently says. Instead, I.C. § 63-60200 says "all" of the units must be 
rented to the three identified income classes. 
It is clear that any redress Appellant seeks to change this language or interpret it 
differently should be placed before the legislature that can change the laws, not the courts that 
cannot. 
III. APPELLANT MUST TERMINATE ITS REGULATORY AGREEMENT TO 
APPLY FOR THE I.C. § 63-602GG PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION. 
Appellant has elected to qualify as Section 42 housing and is subject to a regulatory 
agreement. See Regulatory Agreement R. pp. 70-92, Agreement of Limited Partnership R. pp. 
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94-157, Redemption Agreement R. pp. 172-186. Property tax relief for "Section 42 low-
income" housing is considered under LC. § 63-205A, which allows for reduction in value for tax 
assessment purposes. Appellants therefore inappropriately requested an exemption for 
"nonprofit low-income housing" under LC.§ 63-60200 where the legislature clearly provided 
another section under which Appellants should seek relief. Conversely, I.C. § 63-60200 
pertains to those "non-profit" organizations that are not section 42 housing. Why else would 
there be two entirely different statutes? 
As a result, until Appellant terminates its regulatory agreement and reapplies meeting the 
specifications above, an exemption under I.C. § 62-60200 must be denied. 
IV. CITATION TO IDAHO HOUSING AND FINANCE STATUTES IS 
INAPPLICABLE. 
Appellant relies heavily on cross referencing LC. § 603GG(c)(3) with LC. § 67-6201(c), 
which deals exclusively with Idaho Housing and Finance (IHF A) properties. The problem with 
this argument is the same as the Section 42 housing argument: Idaho has its own IHF A 
exemption under LC.§ 67-6208. Further, this code chapter (LC. § 67-6201 et. seq.) is only to 
be applied to IHF A properties. The property at issue here, however, is owned by Aspen Park, 
Inc., which is not an IHF A property. 
Where the plain language of both statutes is clear about their scope of property covered, 
attempting to read these statutes together only creates unnecessary confusion. 
V. PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ARE NOT PRESUMED. INSTEAD THE 
TAXPAYER MUST MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
To obtain a property tax exemption, the burden of proof falls on the taxpayer to make the 
showing that a tax exemption applies. See Sunset Mem'l Gardens, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 80 Idaho 206, 219, 327 P.2d 766, 774 (1958). "Exemptions are never presumed. The 
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burden is on a claimant to establish clearly a right to exemption. It must be in terms so specific 
and certain as to leave no room for doubt." Id. referencing Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66, 272 
P. 696, 62 A.L.R. 323. "The basis of tax exemptions is the accomplislunent of public purpose 
and not the favoring of particular persons or corporations at the expense of taxpayers generally." 
Id. Further, 
All tax exemption statutes be strictly and narrowly construed against 
the taxpayer, who must show a clear entitlement, and in favor of the 
state. Courts may not presume exemptions, nor may they extend an 
exemption by judicial construction where not specifically 
authorized. 
Ada Cty. Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 
(1993). 
In this case, it is clear that 100% of the units are not dedicated to low-income housing 
where 17% of them are leased to tenants that exceed the 60% county median income threshold. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, Appellant fails to dedicate "all" of its housing units to low-income 
housing in the "manner" prescribed statute. Therefore, the property tax exemption must be 
denied. 
Reliance on an interpretation, albeit from astute minds, that allows up to 45% of the units 
to be rented by non-low-income occupants does not follow the plain language of the statute and 
is misplaced. Further, Appellant's argument flies in the face of performance-based tax 
exemptions for other valuable non-profit and charitable organizations such as LC. § 63-602C, 
which requires a deduction from the exemption for uses that violate the non-profit purpose of the 
organization. Clearly the legislature could not have felt so strongly about low-income housing 
that low-income housing units only have to dedicate a little more than half of its units to a low-
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income purpose in orde r to obtain a complete exempti on. For this reason, not only did the 
legis lature use the te rm ··all .. of the housing units, it also dictated the manner in which "all" 
( I 00%) of the " units shall be rented.'' 1.C. § 63-602GG(c)(3). 
While unfortunate for Appellants, the practical effect o r thi s denial is that Appellant must 
pay property taxes- not fil e fo r bankruptcy, forego its income tax exemption, or be precluded 
from applying for other tax exemptions for which it may otherwise qualify . A request fo r a 
different resu lt should be presented to the legislature. Until then, however, the statute is clear. 
Where the facts are not in dispute and the statute and standards of law are clear the 
District Court' s decision must be affirmed and the tax exemption denied . 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Where the statutory language of I.C. § 63-602GG is clear and unambiguous, and where it 
is clear Appellant' s redress can only be sought through the legislature fo r a change in the law, 
Appellant should be required to pay Bonnevi lle County's costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 
LC.§ 12-11 7, l.C. § 12-1 2 1, I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), and I.A.R. 40 and 41. 
DA TED this .2_J_ day of June, 2018. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi s ~ / day of June, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document upon the foll owing: 
C. Timothy Hopkins 
H OPKINS RODEN CROCKET H ANSEN & 
H OOPES, PLLC 
428 Park Ave. 
Idaho Falls ID 83402 
Michael Kane 
M ichael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
4355 West Emerals Street, Sui te 190 
Boise, ID 83 706 
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[ X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.523.4474 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 208.523.4474 
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